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COMMENTARIES

RICHARD 0.

CUNNINGHAM*

The Restatement as Prologue to Turmoil
in the Law: A Commentary on the
Restatement of U.S. International
Trade Law
The Chinese reportedly have a curse that goes "May you live in interesting
times." Well, these are "interesting times" for the law of international trade.
"Interesting times" because it is the rules of trade, not tariffs, over which
today's conflicts are now fought. Numerous rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations have reduced tariffs in the developed world to levels at which, with
scattered exceptions, they no longer resemble the major barriers to trade that they
constituted at the start of the post-War era. I With the fall of tariffs, however,
nontariff barriers to and distortions of trade have become increasingly important
to nations that seek artificially to maintain or improve their trade position. The
proliferation of such practices has given rise to efforts, led in most instances by
the United States, to devise and gain international consensus on rules prohibiting
or regulating those practices. Thus both the Tokyo Round of the 1970s and the
current Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations have focused primarily
on developing rules of fairness in international trade. 2
*Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C. The author was ably assisted in the preparation
of this commentary by Frederick J. Home, also of Steptoe & Johnson.
1. Final implementation of the Tokyo Round tariff reductions brought the average level of
industrial tariffs in developed countries to 4.7 percent. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND TARIFFS,

GATT ACTIVITIES 1986, at 30 (1987).
2. See Jackson, GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE POLICY INTHE
1980's 159 (W. Cline ed. 1983).
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"Interesting times" also because we have now reached the point at which the
easy issues of trade rules have by and large been resolved: export subsidies, the
basic rules concerning dumping, government procurement, standards, and customs valuation. The issues that remain are vastly more difficult. In many instances, they involve practices that, although they can have a substantial impact
on trade, have domestic functions as well, and thus tend to be strongly supported
by domestic constituencies. Thus, a program of regional development subsidies
is likely to be viewed by the grantor government as a matter of wholly domestic
concern, even where the industries that benefit from such a program are made more
competitive in their export sales. 3 Negotiations to establish rules limiting the use
of such subsidies will be difficult indeed. Even more difficult will be negotiations
aimed at the practices of developing nations: subsidies to their industries, 4 barriers
to market access and foreign investment, 5 and infringement of patents, copyrights,
and trademarks. 6 To these nations, especially those that desperately need export
revenue to service massive international debts, the artificial advantages conferred
by these practices are seen as indispensable for the very reason the United States
and other developed nations want to limit the practices-namely, the increased
share of export markets gained by the developing nations as a result of
"unfair" practices. 7 Finally, there are the immensely difficult problems posed

3. Treasury's finding that Canada was subsidizing tire exports in T.D. 73-10, 7 Treas. Dec. 25
(1973), the Michelin Tire case, was the progenitor of cases raising the issue of domestic subsidies in
general and regional development programs in particular. For a general discussion of the subsidy
involved, see Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981), vacated as moot,
9 Ct. Int'l Trade 38 (1985).
4. Argentina, for example, has in the past provided differential tax treatment to exports of
soybeans as opposed to processed soybeans. In response to a petition filed under § 301, 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 2411 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (current version), by U.S. soybean processors, claiming that the
higher export tax on soybeans gave Argentinean processors access to soybeans at depressed prices,
the Trade Representative initiated an investigation in April 1986. Office of the United States Trade
Representative, National Soybean Association, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,764 (1986). The investigation was
suspended when Argentina took steps to correct the problem, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,685 (1987)
(Presidential determination), but the practice has not been entirely eliminated.
5. United States complaints over Brazilian protection of its informatics industry, for example,
have been difficult to resolve. President Reagan initiated a § 301 investigation into restrictions on
imports of computers and other high technology equipment, limitations on investment, and
inadequate copyright protection of computer software. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Brazil Informatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985). After lengthy negotiations, Brazil
agreed to improve administration of its laws to provide greater access in late 1986 and enacted
legislation to provide copyright protection to software in late 1987. It was not until October 1989,
however, that Brazil made sufficient progress in granting greater market access to justify termination
of the investigation.
6. Even where developing countries such as Brazil and Korea have passed legislation designed
to protect intellectual property, enforcement has often been a problem. Thus, in June 1988 the Trade
Representative initiated a fact-finding investigation to determine the adequacy of patent right
protection in Korea. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Korean Patent Practices, 53
Fed. Reg. 22,758 (1988) (initiation of § 305 investigation).
7. Recent statistics, for example, demonstrate that Argentina has continued to increase its share
of world markets for processed soybean products despite U.S. efforts to put an end to differential tax
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by the ways in which Japan, the most successful of today's trading nations, does
business at home and in the international marketplace. 8 Industries that compete
with Japanese exports allege unfair subsidies, only to discover instead something
much more subtle and amorphous known as "industrial targeting." 9 Industries
frustrated in breaking into the Japanese domestic market find not traditional or
explicit government-imposed barriers, but instead an impenetrable distribution
system, long-established exclusive relationships between industrial purchasers
and their domestic suppliers, and a view that new market entrants would create
undesirable "confusion" or "disorder."' 0 None of these issues lend themselves
readily to rules governing "unfairness."
But the most important reason these times are "interesting" for the rules of
world trade-read "parlous," "dangerous," or perhaps much worse-is that one
of the most important trading nations today feels compelled to seek major
changes in the rules, changes that in every case provoke strong opposition from
some or all of the other trading nations. That nation feels compelled to press for
new rules because its trade and financial deficits have reached levels far
surpassing the worst deficits that any nation has ever incurred. And that nation
has made clear its willingness to break with the world trading system if the rules
of that system do not deal effectively with that nation's perceived trading
difficulties. Already, that nation, emulating its trade partners in the European
Community, has entered a Free Trade Agreement with one of its contiguous
neighbors and a Framework Agreement with the other, agreements that could
lead to a unified continental market much less dependent on trade with outsiders.
The nation in question has also demonstrated its willingness to take unilateral
action to impose on its trading partners its own ideas of what the rules of
international trade should be, even to the point of retaliatory action against a
nation whose alleged "unfair" practice ("unfair" in the eyes of the accuser)
violated no rule contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, no
principle on which the world trading community had ever reached consensus.
By now the reader has undoubtedly divined that this belligerent country, this
desperate trading nation, this potential rogue elephant of world trade, is none
other than the United States of America. Surely it is one of the great historical
ironies that the United States, since World War 11 the standard-bearer in the battle
for a more open trading system, now finds itself suffering the largest trade
deficits in recorded history. And surely it is a strange twist of fate that leads the
United States, traditionally the champion of multilateralism and the opponent of
treatment granted exports of those products. See supra note 5; Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, World Oilseed Situation and Market Highlights, March 1989, at 18.
8. See generally C. PRESTOWITz, TRADING PLACES (1988); K. VON WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF
JAPANESE POWER (1989); Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1989, at 40.

9. See generally Foreign Industrial Targeting and Its Effects on U.S. Industries, Phase I: Japan,
Investigation No. 332-162 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1983) (USITC Pub. No. 1437).
10. See, e.g., Fallows, supra note 8, at 46.
SUMMER 1990

318

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

unilateral protectionism, to create its own regional trading bloc and to feel
compelled unilaterally to impose its own rules on other nations. "Interesting
times" indeed!
In this context, the decision to include in the Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States a chapter on international trade law is a timely
one. The chapter's focus on existing U.S. law and GATT rules is, on the one
hand, an appropriate description of trade "law" as it now stands, yet on the other
hand, incomplete in not conveying the dynamic tension between existing law and
the fundamentally broader set of rules the United States now seeks both
multilaterally and unilaterally.
This Restatement thus provides an important starting point in existing
international trade law that is of great utility, not only in understanding the
present rules of international trade, but also in understanding and evaluating the
current turmoil in trade law and the ways in which the United States is trying to
bring about changes in and expansion of the current rules of fair trade in the
international arena." This commentary, applauding the Restatement's treatment
of existing law, concentrates primarily on the content of and reasons for some of
the major thrusts of U.S. proposals for changes in international trade rules.
I. The Trade Position of the United States
Any attempt to understand and evaluate the current issues in international trade
law should begin with an assessment of the trade position in which our country
now finds itself. And any such assessment quickly leads to the realization that
much has changed since the early post-War period when the United States
thoroughly dominated world trade. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and even
into the 1970s, the U.S. position in world markets was so strong that its
economic interest was clearly best served by advocating expansion of world trade
in an almost unqualified manner. After all, as by far the largest participant in
most areas of agricultural and merchandise trade, the United States had the most
to gain from expansion of that trade. Accordingly, the principal thrust of U.S.
trade policy for nearly four decades was to seek multilateral agreement on
reduction or elimination of tariffs, quotas, and other overt trade barriers.
A useful way to look at that period in U.S. trade policy is to view it as a time
during which expansion of the level of world trade was all-important, while
relatively little attention was paid to factors affecting the share of world trade
11. The United States, of course, is not the only nation seeking substantial changes in the law
of international trade. Canada, for example, has tabled a Uruguay Round proposal for extensive
changes in the area of subsidies and countervailing measures, see generally Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA), July 5, 1989, at A6, and Hong Kong has proposed significant changes in the GATT
Antidumping Code. See generally 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 989 (July 26, 1989). The present
commentary, however, focuses on U.S. efforts for two reasons. First, the author views the United
States as the most important force pressing for change in the GATT system. Second, this is a
commentary on the Restatement of the Foeign Relations Law of the United States.
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held by the United States as opposed to the shares gained by other trading
nations. Indeed, we generally favored the expansion of other nations' shares of
the world trade "pie," as long as the expansion of the pie was sufficient that our
volume of trade kept expanding and our trade account remained in surplus, even
though our share of total trade declined. We wanted the less developed nations
to increase their exports both for humanitarian reasons and because we hoped
that growth of their economies would eventually provide markets for U.S.
exports. And we encouraged the growth of European and Japanese exports,
initially as one means of helping their economies recover from the ravages of
World War II, and later in the interest of having economically strong allies during
the Cold War era.
Relatively little attention was paid by U.S. policy during this period to devices
used by foreign governments to enhance artificially their countries' success in
international trade. If developing countries subsidized their exporting industries,
restricted foreign investment, and failed to enforce U'.S. patents and copyrights,
we largely ignored such practices. If Europe protected and subsidized its agricultural sector and sponsored large industry-government cooperative ventures in
steel, aircraft, and other manufacturing sectors, the U.S. reaction was generally
muted. And if Japan and the other nations of the Pacific Rim developed complex
forms of government interaction with the private sector to nurture and expand
industries with export potential, U.S. trade policy largely ignored these developments. In the relatively few instances in which we did become concerned, the
U.S. approach showed a strong preference for solving the problem through
multilateral agreement on rules of fair play. ' 2 Trade confrontation, threats of
retaliation, and protectionist measures were consistently regarded by U.S. policy
makers as counterproductive responses.
Beginning in the 1970s, and then with a vengeance in the 1980s, the U.S. trade
position changed dramatically. Labor-intensive industries, such as footwear,
clothing, and chinaware, rapidly lost ground to competition from lower-wage
companies in developing nations. Many capital-intensive industries-steel is
perhaps the most prominent example-found it difficult to compete with
European and Japanese rivals that in many cases enjoyed government financial
support. In consumer goods, U.S. producers found themselves losing ground to
low-cost Asian competition at the low end and to better quality Japanese and
European products at the top of the line. Finally, even high-technology
companies began to complain of inroads by patent infringers in the developing
world and of the difficulties of competing against Japanese corporate giants.
The U.S. trade deficit hit a peak of $170 billion in the late 1980s-a record
for any country-amid concerns that America was losing its international
competitiveness.
12. The OECD Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits is an
example. See G. HUFBAUER & J. ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 68-76 (1984).
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II. Extension of the U.S. Import Unfairness Laws
Against this background, it became increasingly difficult for the United
States to maintain a policy focused entirely on expansion of world trade.
Increasingly, policy makers were forced to pay attention to complaints by U.S.
industries (and by Congress) that part of the success of foreign competitors was
accomplished either through unfair competitive tactics (price discrimination,
below cost sales, patent or copyright infringement, etc.) or as a result of the
actions of foreign governments (subsidies, barriers to imports or to foreign
investment, preferential government procurement, forced technology transfer,
and the like).
Initially, in the 1970s and early 1980s, these issues were raised primarily by
U.S. industries that were suffering losses to import competition in their domestic
markets. Rather than resort to explicitly protectionist measures to address these
problems, a series of Democratic and Republican administrations promised the
Congress and the aggrieved industries that they would move aggressively against
"unfair" trade practices under the antidumping law, the countervailing duty law,
and section 337 (dealing primarily with patent and copyright infringement). One
result was a proliferation of litigation under these statutes. Another consequence,
with more profound implications, was the beginning of the process of extending
and elaborating the U.S. import relief laws to deal with new and different
definitions of "unfairness," including:
(i) Early in the 1970s, the Michelin Tire decision extended the countervailing duty law beyond the traditional realm of export subsidies to the
much broader and more controversial subject of domestic or production
subsidies. 13
(ii) The Trade Act of 1974 expanded the Antidumping Law beyond price
discrimination to encompass below-cost selling. 14 Moreover, the test
adopted focused on fully allocated cost, not variable cost. Today, U.S.
antidumping litigation is dominated by cases alleging sales at prices
below cost of production.
(iii) Imports from Communist countries were, in the 1974 Act, made the
subject of a new type of proceeding under which tariffs or quotas could
be imposed to prevent or cure "market disruption." 15
(iv) New methodologies were developed to apply the antidumping law to
6
imports from nonmarket economy countries. '
13. See supra note 4.
14. Trade Act of 1974, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 2046-47 (1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(b) (1982)).
15. Trade Act of
§ 2436 (Law. Co-op.
16. Trade Act of
§ 101, 93 Stat. 144,

1974, § 406, 88 Stat. 1978, 2062-63 (1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C.S.
1983 & Supp. 1989).
1974, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 2047 (1975); Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
184 (1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C.S. § 1677b(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp.

1989)); Electric Golf Cars-Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (Treas. Dep't 1975) (final determination
of sales at less than fair value).
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(v)

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 not only let stand the extension of
countervail law to domestic subsidies, but forbade the Treasury to
reduce the amount of a countervailing duty by an "offset."1 7 In some
prior cases involving a domestic subsidy given to offset some unusual
or government-imposed cost (e.g., a subsidy designed to offset the
higher cost of siting a facility in depressed, high-unemployment
region), the Treasury had countervailed only that portion of the subsidy
that exceeded the cost intended to be offset.
(vi) In the 1979 Trade Agreements Act the application of the countervailing
duty law to domestic subsidies was also extended to cover a wide
spectrum of government benefits. 18 Moreover, the criterion adopted for
determining whether and to what extent a government action is a subsidy
differed significantly from the generally held international view. Most
countries would find a government-provided benefit to be a subsidy only
where its provision entailed a charge on the government account. Under
U.S. law, a benefit provided "on terms inconsistent with commercial
considerations" is a subsidy even if there is no out-of-pocket cost to the
government.
(vii) In a series of cases involving steel and other products a countervailing
duty law methodology was developed that imposed Draconian and
long-lasting duties on imports from government-owned
foreign com9
panies that incurred significant operating losses.'
The results of this movement toward ever more expansive and innovative
application of the import unfair trade laws are, by and large, accurately reflected
in the Restatement. As one might expect, many of our trading partners have
protested various aspects of U.S. law and practice under these statutes. However,
given the imprecision of the GATT Codes, especially the Antidumping Code and
the domestic subsidies language in the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the United States has generally succeeded in its efforts to extend the
scope of its laws governing unfair practices in the import trade. 2"
III. The U.S. Need for New International Rules
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the U.S. pressure for changes in the international rules of trade "fairness" began to shift toward a different and qualita17. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101,93 Stat. 144, 178 (1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(6) (1982)); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979).
18. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 177-78 (1979) (current version at 19
U.S.C.S. § 1677(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)).
19. See generally Barshefsky, Mattice & Martin, Government Equity Participationin StateOwned Enterprises: An Analysis of the Carbon Steel Countervailing Duty Cases, 14 LAW & POL.
INT'L Bus. 1101, 1113-16 (1983).

20. The recent GAIT decision condemning certain aspects of § 337, see generally6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1221 (Sept. 27, 1989), may signal anew willingness to challenge U.S. unfair import practice laws.
The Bush Administration has accepted the panel decision and is preparing to submit amending legislation.
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tively more difficult area-the rules dealing with unfair practices encountered by
U.S. firms outside the United States. To understand this shift in emphasis and why
these issues are of such importance to U.S. policy makers, it may be useful to
return briefly to the current U.S. trade situation.
This commentary has already referred to the massive U.S. trade deficits of the
1980s-$170 million at their peak in 1987, and still over $100 million two years
later despite a very large decline in the value of the dollar. These deficits, the
largest in the history of the international trading system, are a major destabilizing
factor in world trade. Their seriousness is magnified by the fact that the external
indebtedness of the United States has also risen to the highest level ever seen in
the world financial system. If this country is to avoid a substantial decline in its
standard of living, it is essential that the present huge deficit be eliminated in the
relatively near future, and for the United States to begin running at least a trade
surplus and preferably a surplus on its current account (i.e., a trade surplus at a
level more than sufficient to offset the deficit created by payments of interest and
principal on our foreign debt). As John Wayne used to say in the Westerns, "That's
a tall order!"
Conceptually, converting a trade deficit to a trade surplus must involve some
combination of two changes: a reduction in U.S. imports or an increase in U.S.
exports, or both. Put another way, there is a trade-contracting road to eliminate
deficit, and there is also a trade-expanding road. The interests of the United
States and of the world trading system are best served by choosing the path of
trade expansion through increased U.S. exports, and that was the choice made by
the Reagan administration and by our major trading partners in the fall of 1985.
Faced with a crisis in the form of a massive U.S. trade deficit and the imminent
threat of U.S. protectionist legislation, the leading developed nations met in
September 1985 at the Plaza Hotel in New York and agreed upon what came to
be known as the Plaza Accords. 21 All of the parties agreed to resist protectionism
and to work together to bring down the value of the dollar, while the United
States undertook to reduce its budget deficit.
That same month, the Reagan administration announced its own policy for
reducing the U.S. trade deficit. 22 Consistent with the Plaza Accords, the administration rejected a protectionist import-reduction approach. Instead-and this is
the key to an understanding of the developing confrontation over the rules of
international trade-the administration would move vigorously to help U.S.
exporters by eliminating unfair foreign trade practices. This attack on unfair
practices would have two main thrusts. First, the United States would seek in the
upcoming Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations to negotiate international rules dealing with agricultural trade, trade in services, investment, sub21. See generally, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at AI, col. 6.
22. See President's Radio Address to the Nation, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1047 (Sept. 7,
1985).
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sidies, intellectual property, and other areas in which U.S. companies now
encounter foreign laws, practices, and governmental policies that hamper their
export activities. Second, the administration would proceed under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974,23 a hitherto neglected section of the U.S. trade laws,
against unfair foreign government practices. The administration would even go
so far as to initiate a series of cases under that statute.
At this point it may be prudent to interject a cautionary thought. No economist
or trade policy maker, and certainly not this commentator, would or should
espouse the view that changes in the rules of "fairness" in international trade are
the factor to be given greatest emphasis in enhancing U.S. export performance.
Surely currency relationships, the U.S. budget deficit, the rate of U.S. savings
and investment, attention to product quality and longer-range corporate strategies, and numerous other considerations, are central to this problem.
The successful resolution of these trade law issues is of real significance in at
least three ways. First, the amount of trade directly affected by a specific "fair
trade" issue is often quite significant. In the 1989 negotiation with Japan on
telecommunications issues, the benefit to U.S. sales from the successful conclusion of the negotiation was estimated at $2 billion. 24 Second, the "fair trade"
issues have undeniable political significance. Without exception, every U.S.
administration for at least the last three decades has found the posture of vigorous
action against unfair foreign practices to be an indispensable element of its
opposition to protectionist pressures. Third, the current unsatisfactory state of the
international trading rules in a number of areas directly affects corporate strategic
decisions that are important to enhanced U.S. export performance. This is especially true in the areas of intellectual property protection, trade in services,
investment, and, for some industries, domestic subsidies.
Thus the United States government really has no option but to press for major
changes in and additions to the rules of fairness in areas important to the foreign
activities of U.S. companies. Among the more important issues on which change
will be sought are:
A.

AGRICULTURAL TRADE RULES

Almost all participants in agricultural trade engage in large-scale subsidization,
price manipulation, import barriers, or in some cases, all three. The European
Community has its Common Agricultural Policy. 25 The United States has at
various times utilized price supports, acreage allotments, deficiency payments,
and on the export subsidy side, the Export Enhancement Program.26 Japan has
23. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2411 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (current version).
24. See generally Washington Post, June 16, 1989, at Fl, col. 1.
25.

See generally 2 LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 189 (D. Vaughan ed. 1986).

26. See Commodity Credit Corporation, Dep't of Agriculture, Export Enhancement Program, 50
Fed. Reg. 23,750 (1985).
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quotas and high tariffs or both on a broad range of agricultural products. And
developing countries employ a variety of market-distorting measures, such as the
differential export tax system used by Argentina, Brazil, and Malaysia to guarantee a profit to exporters of processed products even when they export at prices
lower than the world price of the raw product.27
In recent years, the United States has seen its share of world agricultural
markets fall significantly. 28 Moreover, its efforts to challenge foreign agricultural
practices under current GATT rules have met with little success. 2 9 Accordingly,
U.S. negotiators in the Uruguay Round have made reform of agricultural trade
rules a primary negotiating objective, with the stated goal of reaching a
multilateral commitment to end all trade-distorting agricultural policies, and
specifically all subsidies for agricultural products, within a specified period. This
U.S. effort, supported by a group of smaller nations (the Cairns Group), 3 °
proved so controversial that it nearly brought the entire Uruguay Round to a
shuddering halt. The European Community refused categorically to discuss any
commitment to total elimination of farm subsidies, proposing instead to discuss
short-term agricultural reform, a phasing down (but not out) of subsidies, and the
development of more comprehensive GATIT rules on agriculture. A crisis was
averted only when the United States backed down in April 1989 from its demand
for a total subsidy ban and the European Community committed itself to begin
implementation of long-term reform by "substantial progressive reductions in
agricultural support and protection over an agreed period of time" after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 3 1 The MTN talks are continuing on this basis,
but results are difficult to predict.
B.

TRADE IN SERVICES

With U.S. competitiveness in many manufacturing industries at a low ebb,
some observers see revenues earned abroad by U.S. service industries, which
range from the professions (law, accounting) to financial services (banking,

27. See supra note 5.
28. See U.S. GENERAL

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

WORLD

AGRICULTURE: FACTORS

INFLUENCING

TRENDS IN WORLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE 19-32 (1989) (Doc. No. GAO/RECD-

89-1).
29. Inthe § 301 proceeding against Argentina's differential export tax system, see supra note 5,
an agreement was negotiated under which Argentina agreed to reduce and eventually eliminate the
subsidy. Later, however, the Alfonsin government informed the United States that it could not make
good on its undertaking, citing domestic political difficulties. Negotiations between the two countries
continue sporadically. In cases against the European Common Agricultural Policy, the United States

has challenged the EC export refund system as applied to wheat flour and pasta. These challenges
resulted in GATT panel reports in 1983 that have yet to be adopted.

30. Members include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay.
31. GATT, Trade Negotiations Committee Mid-Term Review Agreements (approved text on
agriculture para. 6, MTN.TNC/II) (Apr. 21, 1989).
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insurance, securities), to construction, as a major area of optimism for improvement in our trade account. Yet many countries have substantial barriers to effective
participation by U.S. and other foreign service industries, ranging from outright
prohibition to discriminatory standards and preferential government procurement.
Moreover, subsidies are a problem in this area, just as in merchandise trade. The
United States is pressing in the Uruguay Round for rules eliminating barriers to
trade in services, and has also pressed services issues in a number of bilateral
confrontations. 32 Resistance to this effort has been surprisingly ubiquitous. Developing nations have resisted this effort, as one might expect, but equal if not
greater problems in specific areas have developed with respect to Japan and the
European Community.
C.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Most commentators on U.S. competitiveness emphasize that the single most
important key to maintaining and improving our nation's competitive posture lies
in the areas of advanced technology and product innovation. Yet if we are to take
advantage commercially of the new technologies we originate and the new
products we develop, we must have international rules to prevent competitors in
other countries from violating our patents and copyrights. Both in the Uruguay
Round and in a series of bilateral negotiations and section 301 cases, the United
States has made intellectual property issues a centerpiece of our effort to obtain
effective rules of fair trade. It has been, perhaps next to agriculture, the most
confrontational of the current international trade issues.
The Uruguay Round discussions on this issue demonstrate vividly the intense
resistance to the goal so fervently sought by the United States. In this controversy,
the United States has generally been supported by the other developed countries.
The deeply entrenched opposition comes from the developing nations. The advanced countries have insisted that the GATT talks cover substantive standards for
intellectual property rights protection, enforcement mechanisms, and GATT dispute resolution procedures. Most developing nations, led by Brazil, have philosophical objections to every aspect of this agenda. Their view is that they should
not be required to maintain or acquiesce in the monopoly positions of companies
in the developed world by enforcing those companies' intellectual property rights.
Their argument is often cast in terms of seeking to avoid the price increases (in
pharmaceuticals, for example) that would result from enforcement of patents and
32. The dispute over access by U.S. banks to European markets on nondiscriminatory terms,
discussed below, is just one example. There have been numerous confrontations with Japan,
including conflict over bidding by U.S. firms for public works projects (Kansai Airport), (see
generally Financial Times, Mar. 31, 1988, at 6, col. 2), the cellular phone/telecommunications
dispute in the spring of 1989, and even a § 301 petition filed anonymously by U.S. lawyers working
in Tokyo (the "Roppongi Bar Association") challenging lack of access to Japan's legal services
market (see Petition under Section 301 on Access to the Legal Services Market in Japan: Decision
Not to Initiate an Investigation, 52 Fed. Reg. 7,362 (1987)).
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copyrights. At bottom, however, the critical interest of these countries is to bring
about technology and product innovation transfer to help develop competitive
domestic industries. In addition to their positions on substantive issues, the
developing countries contend that the World Intellectual Property Organization
and other non-GATT groups are the appropriate fora for intellectual property
discussions.
This issue, along with agriculture and two others, 33 came close to derailing the
entire Uruguay Round in late 1988. At the midterm ministerial review at Montreal
in December 1988, the refusal of the developing countries to proceed on the
intellectual property issues (and of the European Community to proceed with
agricultural issues) ran head-on into U.S. insistence that these issues were critical
to its trade interests and must be included in any ultimate Uruguay Round
agreements. So serious was this rift that all fifteen negotiation areas of the Round
had to be suspended for four months for separate emergency negotiations in the
areas of disagreement. With respect to intellectual property, the result at the end
of four months was little more than a modus vivendi. The developing nations
acquiesced in continued intellectual property discussions, but reserved their right
to renew their objection that these issues should not be included in the final
Uruguay Round agreements, and indeed should not be dealt with in the GATT at
all. Thus a further confrontation appears likely at the end of the Round.
D.

INVESTMENT

One trend that appears irreversible is the growing internationalization of U.S.
corporations. Increasingly, U.S. firms are considering investment in production
or assembly facilities abroad for access to raw materials and cheaper labor, and
in many cases simply to be a "corporate citizen" of the country in which they
want to be significant market participants. Problems occur, however, when
foreign governments adopt policies designed either to lure U.S. investment
through artificial incentives (subsidies, preferential procurement, import protection, and the like) or to attach conditions (such as minimum local content, local
employment requirements, or forced technology transfer) to foreign investment.
Further, some countries prohibit foreign investment altogether in certain industries or regions. Here again, the United States is seeking new rules in the
Uruguay Round to regulate such trade-related investment measures (or TRIMS,
in Uruguay Round argot). And here again, the principal resistance to new rules
comes from the developing countries.
E.

DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES

One of the great achievements for the United States in the Tokyo Round was
the establishment, in the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, of a
33. Textiles and safeguards.
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prohibition on the use of export subsidies. With regard to domestic subsidies (plant
financing, research and development assistance, and a host of other governmental
benefits not directly keyed to exports but which reduce an exporting company's
costs), the United States was largely unsuccessful in obtaining effective rules.
Indeed, the Code signatories explicitly acknowledged "that subsidies other than
export subsidies are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of
social and economic policy objectives" and affirmed that the signatories "do not
intend to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and
other important policy objectives which they consider desirable." 34 The most that
could be negotiated was a recognition that such domestic subsidies "may cause
or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry of another signatory or serious
prejudice to the interests of another signatory," 35 together with a lukewarm
undertaking that:
Signatories shall therefore seek to avoid causing such effects through the use of
subsidies. In particular, signatories . . . shall also weigh, as far as practicable, taking
account of the nature of the particular case, possible adverse effects on trade. They
shall also consider the conditions of world trade, production
(e.g., price, capacity
36
utilization, etc.) and supply in the product concerned.
This is pretty fuzzy stuff, at best. So, having failed to negotiate international rules
restricting the use of domestic subsidies, the United States proceeded to enact quite
Draconian countervailing duty law provisions to provide a remedy against inju37
rious imports benefitting from domestic subsidies. *
Today it is becoming ever more clear that a harsh countervailing duty law is not
adequate to protect U.S. interests in this field. There are at least three reasons for
this conclusion. First, it has become clear that the countervailing duty remedy is
ineffective in a number of important subsidy situations. Research and development assistance, for example, often proves difficult to identify and quantify. In
some cases there is also a time dysfunction that makes countervailing duty relief
ineffective. This occurs when subsidies are provided by a foreign government to
nurture the early development of an infant industry. At the time the subsidies are
given, the infant industry is not exporting to the United States and thus cannot
be the subject of a countervail case. Later, when the foreign industry matures to
the point where its exports to the United States become a problem, the subsidies
that were given earlier, in the infancy of the industry, have been terminated and
cannot be reached in a countervail case. Finally, in many commodity markets, a
countervailing duty imposed on imports from one country will be largely ineffective because those imports will simply be redirected to other destinations,
displacing volume there which would then flow to the United States.
34. GATT Subsidies Code, opened for signature Apr. 12, 1979, art. 11, reprinted in GATT,
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents [BISDI, 26th Supp. 69-70 (1980).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Second, there are situations in which it may be counterproductive to impose
import duties against subsidized imports of raw materials or intermediate products. This problem was presented in stark form by the semiconductor cases, in
which the imposition of substantial duties on Japanese semiconductor imports
threatened the competitiveness of U. S. computer makers and other semiconductor
user industries vis-A-vis Japanese and European companies that would have had
continued access to cheaper semiconductors. 38
Finally, and most important, the countervailing duty remedy is not helpful for
U.S. companies that encounter subsidized competition in markets outside the
United States. For a country that badly needs to increase exports as a means of
reducing its trade deficit, an import remedy is simply not the answer to the
problem of domestic subsidies.
For all of these reasons, the United States needs to establish international rules
that will effectively prevent, or at least limit, the providing of domestic subsidies.
This, however, may prove the most difficult and confrontational of all Uruguay
Round topics. Developing countries view domestic subsidies as integral to their
economic development plans and are thus reluctant in the extreme to agree to
limits. Japan, where complex and subtle forms of government-business interaction
are common, has sharp differences with U.S. views on "targeting" 39 and many
other domestic subsidy questions. Canada has argued that the domestic subsidies
of one country should be considered a problem only to the extent that they exceed
the domestic subsidies provided by the government of the complaining country.4
And even the
European Community, which has formulated its own regulation of
"state aids, '" 4 1 insists that some large areas of trade (notably aircraft manufacturing) must not be subject to limitations on domestic subsidies.
In short, the posture of the United States in trade today is one of insistence on
important changes in a wide spectrum of international trading rules. The substance
of those proposals is, in almost every case, extremely controversial. But even
more controversial has been the recent willingness of the United States to take
unilateral actions to enforce its ideas of "fairness" against its trading partners.
IV. Unilateral Efforts by the United States to Impose
Its Rules on Other Nations
Despite the lack of agreement within the GATT membership on the expanded
rules of "fairness" pressed by the United States, the United States has in a
38. See, e.g., 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Components from Japan, Investigation
No. 731-TA-270 (Final) (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1986) (USITC Pub. No. 1862); Determination
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986) (Presidential suspension of
§ 301 semiconductors investigation).
39. The 1988 trade amendments, for example, included a provision making export targeting an
"unreasonable" practice for purposes of § 301. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2411(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
40. See supra note 12.
41. See generally D. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW 372-84 (1988).
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number of instances moved unilaterally to enforce upon trading partners the very
rules on which it is trying in the Uruguay Round to negotiate international
agreements. The rationale for such unilateralism was expressed by thenAmbassador to GATT Michael Samuels, explaining U.S. reluctance to acquiesce
in the formation of a GATT panel requested by Brazil to inquire into the validity
of sanctions imposed on Brazilian imports by the United States in retaliation for
Brazil's failure to protect U.S. pharmaceutical patents:
What's at issue here is an imbalance in rights and obligations that affords Brazil an
opportunity in the GATT to address a trade dispute affecting Brazilian exports and
denies the United States the right to address a practice by Brazil affecting the same
amount of U.S. trade. . . . Where there are no rules to protect inventors in their
commercial transactions, the legitimately aggrieved parties must necessarily take
action.42
This position-that the United States is entitled to take retaliatory measures
against another nation's "unfair" practice in an area not covered by internationally agreed rules-underlies a series of section 301 proceedings against countries
failing to honor U.S. patents and copyrights. 43 Nor has U.S. unilateralism been
restricted to the intellectual property area.
Beginning in 1988, a trade war over agriculture loomed when the European
Community implemented its ban on the sale of hormone-treated meat and the
United States responded by imposing retaliatory tariffs on approximately $100
million worth of European imports. The ban effectively eliminated U.S. exports
of beef to the European Community because U.S. beef, unlike European beef, is
generally raised with the assistance of hormones. The European Community has
contended that the hormone ban is legal under GATT because it is a health
measure that treats domestic and imported meat in the same fashion. Thus, U.S.
retaliation is not legal under GATT both because there was no GATT violation
against which the United States could retaliate and because the United States did
not complete GATT dispute resolution procedures before imposing sanctions.
The United States contended that there was no scientific basis for the ban and that
the regulation therefore represented a discriminatory barrier to imports from the
United States in violation of GATT. Efforts to form a GATT panel to resolve the
dispute were frustrated during the period preceding the imposition of the ban
because the United States and the European Community could not agree on the
proper topic for panel discussion. The European Community desired a determi-

42. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22, 1989) (emphasis added). The United States, in the
face of nearly universal condemnation, ultimately acceded to the demand for a panel.
43. One example is the initiation of a § 305 investigation into Korean practices, see supra note
7. Others include investigations of protection afforded pharmaceuticals in Brazil and Argentina. See
Unfair Trade Practices; Brazil Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals; Initiation of an Investigation,
52 Fed. Reg. 28,223 (1987); Office of United States Trade Representative Initiation of Section 301
Investigation; Argentina's Failure to Provide Adequate and Effective Intellectual Property Protection
for Pharmaceuticals, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,668 (1988).
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nation of its legal right to impose health restrictions on imports, while the United
States wanted a scientific inquiry into the validity of the basis for the ban.
Further hostilities were narrowly averted by creation in February 1989 of a
joint European Community-United States task force to discuss the ban. By early
May the two sides had reached agreement on certification procedures to allow the
resumption of imports from the United States of meat from animals not treated
with hormones. Although escalation has thus far been prevented, the U.S.
sanctions remain in place and it is significant that the conflict had to be addressed
bilaterally, rather than through existing multilateral institutions. As this commentary is written (October 1989), discussions are continuing as to which types
of meat products will be accepted in Europe.
Threats of unilateral action have also characterized controversies between the
United States and the European Community over aspects of the proposals to
create a unified European market by 1992. Two areas of particular concern to the
United States have been procedures for setting technical standards and banking.
As part of the unification process, the European Community has begun
developing technical standards for products that would apply throughout the
European Community. The concern of the United States has been that, in spite
of GATT requirements for transparency and prohibitions on the use of standards
and regulations to protect domestic products, new standards could exclude U.S.
imports. Exporters feared that they would receive inadequate notice of forthcoming standards and that even if their products complied with European standards, certification requirements would discriminate against non-European
products. Their concerns were heightened by the refusal of the European Community to allow U.S. exporters input into the standards-setting process and the
type of informal advance notice of standards that participation provides to European manufacturers. The controversy was muted by an agreement reached
between the United States and the European Community that, while not giving
the United States a "seat at the table," established a "dialogue" between the
European standards-setting bodies, their counterparts in the United States, and
United States government representatives. This dialogue will at least ensure that
European standards are not drawn with total disregard for U.S. interests.
Concerns with respect to banking focused on the possible denial of national
treatment to foreign-owned banks operating in Europe. As part of the internal
liberalization of the European financial sector, banks licensed to operate in one
country will be allowed to operate Community-wide. Various proposals were
made, however, to limit the ability of foreign-owned banks to participate in the
new market. The most restrictive would have imposed a reciprocity requirement
on all such banks; if a home country did not provide market access equivalent to
the unified European market, a foreign-owned bank could not operate
Community-wide. A possible restriction of this nature had been of particular
concern to the United States because the United States does not have a unified
banking market due to limitations on interstate banking. Thus, in order to qualify
VOL. 24, NO. 2

RESTATEMENT AND INT'L TRADE LAW

331

for reciprocal treatment, the United States would have been required to grant
European banks treatment more favorable than that given domestic banks. The
United States, therefore, complained vociferously that the appropriate standard
was whether a country granted European banks national treatment, and that while
GATT admittedly did not cover services, a reciprocity requirement was inconsistent with the spirit of GATT and would be detrimental to the ongoing Uruguay
Round negotiations in services.
This controversy, too, was muted by a decision of the European Community's
financial ministers in June to accept an approach that embodied national treatment
rather than reciprocity. Foreign-owned banks whose home countries grant national
treatment to European banks will be permitted to operate Community-wide. If the
foreign country does not allow market access comparable to that available in the
newly integrated European Community, however, the European Community may
choose to initiate negotiations aimed at liberalizing the foreign country's markets.
The United States could be a target for such negotiations.
Recently enacted U.S. legislation has further heightened foreign concerns about
U.S. unilateralism. Many provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, 44 particularly those that strengthen section 301, will place added
tension on existing norms. Some provisions were specifically intended to encourage GATT reforms by threatening action outside GATT if acceptable changes
were not forthcoming. Thus, Congress amended section 301 procedures to require
conclusion of investigations within eighteen months even if formal GATT dispute
resolution procedures have not been completed. 45 Other provisions of the new law
reflect the U.S. intention to protect its trade rights by self-help measures when
necessary. A major goal of the Omnibus Trade Act was to give U.S. trade
negotiators leverage to enforce the U.S. view of open and fair trade upon its
trading partners. By making retaliation more likely and less discretionary against
those countries identified as engaging in "unfair" practices, Congress placed a
powerful weapon in the hands of sometimes reluctant U.S. trade officials and told
them in no uncertain terms to use it to induce other countries to change their
policies.
The Spring 1989 spate of U.S. identifications under these provisions of countries engaged in unfair trading practices has done nothing to allay foreign fears
over U.S. willingness to work outside GAT. The United States Trade Representative named Japan, Brazil, and India as priority countries under a provision
of the Omnibus Trade Act known as "Super 30 1.46 Super 301 requires the Trade
Representative to identify priority unfair trade practices and priority foreign

44. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
45. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat.
1107, 1176-79 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.S. § 2420 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)).
46. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat.
1164, 1170-72. See H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 74 (1987).
SUMMER 1990

332

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

countries that engage in such practices. The Trade Representative must initiate
negotiations with the priority countries to eliminate each country's priority practices. If negotiations fail, the Trade Representative must consider appropriate
retaliatory action under section 301. To the extent that the practices in question
violate a trade agreement, deny most favored nation or national treatment, or deny
protection of intellectual property rights, retaliation is mandatory.
Following the Super 301 designations, the United States was subjected to
harsh criticism for this approach, notably at the meeting of OECD ministers at
the end of May and at the GATT council meeting in June. In a statement directed
primarily against the United States, the final communique of the OECD ministers
"firmly reject[ed] the tendency towards unilateralism, bilateralism, sectoralism
and managed trade which threatens the multilateral system and undermines the
Uruguay Round negotiations." 47 Similarly, various GATT countries condemned
the United States for its presumption in defining unfair trade practices in the
absence of consensus and then proceeding to act as jury and to pass sentence
upon those countries which allegedly violated the rules it set forth.
Each of the named countries had indicated unwillingness to negotiate under
the threat of retaliation, raising the prospect of U.S. imposition of retaliatory
measures, followed by these countries' demands for GATT panels to declare the
sanctions GATT-illegal. Such panel rulings would create a head-on confrontation
between the GATT regime and the centerpiece of the most recent U.S. trade
legislation.
Comparable issues of unilateral U.S. action arise under the telecommunications and intellectual property provisions of the Omnibus Trade Act. 4 8 With
regard to telecommunications, the Act sets forth a similar priority country
scheme and requires negotiations designed to open telecommunications markets
in the selected countries. Mandatory retaliation is required if no agreement is
reached. The European Community and South Korea were targeted for negotiation in February. Under another telecommunications provision, the Trade
Representative announced at the end of April that it would consider appropriate
sanctions against Japan for its failure to live up to market access commitments
made in Market-Oriented, Sector-Specific telecommunications negotiations in
the mid-1980s. This latter dispute was resolved in late June when Japan agreed
to specific measures designed to increase access to its telecommunications
markets.
V. Conclusion: The Critical Juncture Lies Ahead
As this commentary is written, the future course of U.S. policy is by no means
clear. Certainly negotiations in the Uruguay Round for new and expanded trading
47. The text of the communique appears in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 748 (June 7, 1989).
48. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1371-1381,
102 Stat. 1107, 1216-24.
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rules will continue to be pressed vigorously. But the prospects for achieving the
U.S. negotiating goals are uncertain at best. In the meantime, U.S. unilateral
action in the same areas that are under MTN negotiation is coming under
increasing attack by our trading partners. Some retreat from these unilateral
measures appears likely, in order not to risk undermining the Uruguay Round.
What will be the response of the United States should the Uruguay Round fail
to reach agreement on the new rules seen as so important by U.S. policy makers?
At that juncture, the times would become extremely "interesting" in the fullest
sense of the curse.
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